The first chapter of my book presents Leonard Peikoff’s analysis of “first-level” generalizations. These are generalizations that a toddler can grasp without antecedent generalizations; for example, “pushing a ball makes it roll.” On page 19, I quote from Dr. Peikoff’s lectures:
“A ‘first-level generalization’ is one derived directly from perceptual observation, without the need of any antecedent generalizations. As such, it is composed only of first-level concepts; any form of knowledge that requires the understanding of higher-level concepts cannot be gained directly from perceptual data.”
Some readers have raised the issue of whether concepts of attributes and actions are properly regarded as “first-level” concepts. They point out that we first grasp concepts of perceived entities, and conclude that the first-level should be restricted to these concepts. According to this view, concepts such as “red,” “round,” “pushing,” and “rolling” are higher-level.
I think this view derives from a failure to grasp what is meant by “level” in Objectivist epistemology. The concept “level” pertains to the hierarchical nature of knowledge. In Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, Dr. Peikoff writes:
“A hierarchy of knowledge means a body of concepts and conclusions ranked in order of logical dependence, one upon another, according to each item’s distance from the base of the structure. The base is the perceptual data with which cognition begins.”
This base obviously includes the data integrated by concepts of attributes and actions that are directly perceived. If we classify such concepts as “first-level,” then the idea serves an important function: we can talk about the reduction of higher-level knowledge to the first-level. But if we made the error of restricting the first-level to concepts of perceived entities, what function would this idea serve? The first-level would be so impoverished that nothing could be reduced to it. This restricted idea is a definition by inessentials.
Thank you for this post it has answered several of my questions.
One question I still don’t have an answer for and I suspect that there isn’t one is, if as your critics say a concept like red is second level because concepts like table or ball have to be grasped first, how does this fact put concepts like red and rolling on a higher conceptual level than table or ball.
Tables, balls, red and rolling are all directly perceived regardless of the fact that concepts of entities have to be grasped first.
Another way to approach this issue is if red is a higher level concept than a first level concept has to be associated with it to reduce it back to reality. I know of no such concepts.
Rick,
Of course, “red” doesn’t have to refer to any specific thing in particular, so in that sense “table” isn’t necessary. That is, there does have to be _some_ thing for “red” to refer to though. Keep in mind that “red” as a word is an adjective; “red” as a concept must be about some thing (ultimately symbolized by a noun.)
“Red” could not possibly be used the way “table” is used. They’re both different metaphysically and epistemicly. This type of distinction between an adjective concept and a noun concept does not change the fact that both a red thing and a table are both directly perceivable.
I also have to add (at least in passing) that it would appear that most if not all of the attacks against _The Logical Leap_ which I’ve come across involve contextual fallacies and are typically rationalistic.
To make this more clear let me know if I get this right.
The confusion caused by classifying concepts such as “red” as higher-level stems from a misguided application of the primacy of existence. Because “red” is an attribute of an entity it does not hold primacy, the entity does; true. This is a metaphysical statement. However, some people forget this distinction and mix this fact with the epistemological distinction of hierarchy. In essence they are mixing categories. To them since “red” is an attribute (because it’s not existentially primary) it therefore cannot be a first-level concept. But this is the wrong way to look at it. Metaphysically it is an attribute and not primary but epistemologically because it is on the perceptual level it is among the first concepts we form. It may not be chronologically first as Rand points out in ITOE (p. 15-16) but it is still among the perceptually first concepts and therefore a first-level concept. In a way they are getting hung up on the “first” in first-level.